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CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
LESLIE PICKERING FRANCIst
INTRODUCTION
Americans-some of them at least-enjoy a remarkable range of
expectations about their health care. They have come to rely on
free choice of physicians, on autonomy and the doctrine of
informed consent to care, on the belief that they can get the best
care money can buy, on the assumption that resources will be
available to pay for that care, and perhaps even on the hope that
death can be cheated for at least a little while. But these expectations are fragile for those who have them, and they are not shared
by many others. As the 1992 presidential campaign gathers steam,
polls indicate that even the affluent are worried about whether their
relatively secure access to health care will continue and what they
will do if it does not.' Other Americans-the more than thirty-one
million who lack health insurance 2 --continue to have few if any
expectations about health care at all.
Changes in American health care are certain to disappoint some
expectations, modify others, and create entirely new ones. Some of
these changes are already accelerating, as union contracts are
renegotiated with diminished health benefits, as major insurers pull
out of entire markets, and as states such as Oregon propose
significant revisions in their Medicaid programs or seek more
3
ambitiously to fund care for greater proportions of their residents.

t Professor of Law & Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Utah. J.D.
University of Utah, 1981; Ph.D. University of Michigan, 1974; B.A. Wellesley College,
1967. An earlier version of portions of this Article has appeared as an essay entitled

Expectationsand the Design of a UniversalHealth CareSystem in CHANGING TO NATIONAL
HEALTH CARE (Robert P. Huefner & Margaret P. Battin eds., 1992).
1See, e.g., Don Colburn & Richard Morin, Americans Grade Their Health Care,
WASH. PoST, Dec. 31, 1991, at H6 (discussing health care poll results in light of
upcoming elections).
2 See, e.g., Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: FromDilemma to Crisis,265JAMA 2491,
2491 (1991) (noting that the number of Americans who lack public or private
coverage is between 31 and 36 million).
3 For a description of the Oregon proposals, see Charles J. Dougherty, Setting
Health Care Priorities: Oregon's Next Steps, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Supp. May-June
(1881)
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If any of the proposals for national health policy bear fruit soon,
4
further changes are likely.
Expectations appear with remarkable frequency in discussions
of the current state of American health policy; the contributions to
the first section of this symposium are no exception. 5 Sometimes,
expectations are regarded sympathetically. A standard argument for
construing ERISA as strongly protective of the health benefits of
retired workers, for example, is protecting the expectations of
retirees. 6 More often today, however, high levels of expectations
about health benefits are portrayed as unrealistic and uneconomical.
From the automobile industry to public utilities, the high costs of
health insurance are a standing recessionary theme. 7 Critics of
1991, at 1.
4 For a discussion of the moral issues raised by some of the proposals for
universal health care, see CHANGING TO NATIONAL HEALTH CARE (Robert P. Huefner
& Margaret P. Battin eds., 1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL HEALTH].
5 See, e.g., Robert Blank, Regulatoty Rationing A Solution to Health Care Resource
Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REV.-,-(1992) (noting that "the public has developed
unrealistic
expectations"). [ED. NOTE-PIN IS BEFORE N.14]
6
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd, 861
F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989), provides a good example
of this.
It would be contrary to the spirit of ERISA to hold that rights promised
welfare benefit plans are mere gratuities terminable at the will of the
employer.... Congress has sought to fortify retirement income-not by
mandating that individuals get more ofit-butby seeking to assure that such
income provide a reliable predictable source of financial support. Once an
employee has rendered his years of service to the employer, his "sweat
equity," and has taken retirement, the employee furnishes little to the
employer that generates revenue ....
The retirees have no economic
leverage, hence no bargaining position to check modifications of benefits
made solely in the interest of their former employer. To permit the
enforcement of termination/modification clauses without a showing of good
cause has the effect of reducing the status of hard earned welfare plan
benefits to mere gratuities. Accurate financial forecasting or retirement
planning is impossible because continuation of the benefits is subject to the
discretion of an employer. The exercise of such discretion without a "for
cause" standard cuts against Congress' intent to safeguard these retirement
benefits.
Id. at 1496-97. The desire to protect expectations figured prominently in congressional debates leading to the Act's passage: "As part of [ERISA's] closely integrated
regulatory system Congress included various safeguards to preclude abuse and 'to
completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark
reform legislation.'" Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990)
(quoting S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973)).
7 For example, public utilities have generally provided their employees and
retirees with first dollar insurance coverage, passing the costs on to consumers by rate
increases. Consumer groups now argue that rate increases should not automatically
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American expenditures on technology and on intensive care at the
end of life blame unrealistic expectations about the power of health
care to conquer death.8 British commentators have long contended
that Americans expect too much from health care generally and
9
technology in particular.
Nonetheless, despite their salience in policy discussions,
expectations have received little direct examination. This Article is
an attempt to further discussion of the moral and legal significance
of some of the American consumers' most important expectations
about their health care. Do any of these expectations matter
morally? If so, which ones matter, and why? Or, are all expectations about access to health care simply unrealistic in today's world
of spiralling health costs? Are expectations about access given legal
protection, by statute or the common law of contract? If so, do the
legal protections correspond even roughly to the moral picture
about expectations?
This Article begins with an outline of the variety of consumer
expectations about health care. It then presents some basic
elements of a moral theory of expectations, and applies the theory
to several examples of expectations about the level of care that will
be funded and about the continuation of current funding arrangements. Summarized briefly, the conclusion is that the strongest
moral case can be made for expectations of continued access to
moderate levels of care when they have been encouraged by
employers or insurers. The Article then turns to an examination of
the current state of legal protection for health care expectations.
As the costs of meeting even modest expectations of workers or
retirees continue to escalate, these expectations increasingly are
disappointed. Plant closures and industrial bankruptcies illustrate
the burdens imposed by retiree benefits on some employers, and
the resulting fragility of those benefits.1 0 Under ERISA in particufund such generous health benefits, particularly for future retirees. See, e.g., Milt
Freudenheim, Utilities Want to RaiseRates To Meet FutureHealth Costs, N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
7, 1992, at D1 (discussing consumer advocate opposition to utilities' use of rate

increases to cover health costs).

8 See PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH
CARE 190-91 (1990).
9 See, e.g.,John G. Francis & Leslie P. Francis, Rationingof Health Care in Britain:
An EthicalCritiqueofPublicPolicy-making,in SHOULD MEDICAL CARE BE RATIONED BY
AGE? 119, 125-26 (Timothy M. Smeeding ed., 1987) (noting American inclination
toward excessive medical treatment using complex and expensive technology).
0 See, e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193-94 (6th Cir. 1986)
(upholding employer's termination of retired employees' welfare benefits in context
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lar, the Article then argues, benefit protection has been limited to
written contractual specifications. The result is legal protection of
contractually based expectations, even if they are quite generous,
but not protection of other expectations for which there is arguable
moral support. This discontinuity, the Article concludes, provides
a rich source of arguments for discussion of universal health policy
in the United States. On the one hand, failure to meet legitimate
expectations should be a matter of public concern. On the other
hand, if some current expectations are unreasonable, public
dialogue can help provide both a justification for decisions not to
meet these expectations, and a context that shapes these expectations in more reasonable directions.
[. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT HEALTH CARE

"Expectations" are beliefs about the future upon which people
rely in structuring their lives. Many different kinds of expectations
are characteristic of contemporary American health care. Although
the term "expectations" appears frequently in discussions of
physician-patient relationships and of access to health care, there
has been little systematic study of the actual expectations of either
patients or physicians. Some studies in the social psychology
literature have focused on expectations as they affect particular
physician-patient encounters.
For example, Russell Jones has
studied how patients' expectations about symptoms and diseases
affect their decisions about whether to seek care, 11 and Peter Ditto
andJames Hilton have examined how physicians' expectations affect
diagnostic decisions and how patients' expectations affect compliance with therapeutic recommendations. 12 These studies, however, do not consider the extent to which economic factors contribute
to the decision to seek treatment or, more generally, the extent to
which both physician and patient expectations are shaped by health
care organization and funding. Consequently, the descriptions of
expectations which follow are somewhat speculative. They are
postulated as characteristic of the kinds of expectations that patients

of bankruptcy negotiation).
11 See, e.g., Russell A. Jones, Expectations and Delay in Seeking Medical Care, 46 J.
SOC. ISSUEs 81, 84-91 (1990) (concluding that expectations about bodily states,
symptoms, and diseases produce delay in seeking medical care).
2 See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto &James L. Hilton, Expectancy Processes in the Health Care
InteractionSequence, 46J. Soc. IssuEs 97, 109-17 (1990) (analyzing how expectations
affect patient/provider interaction).
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and physicians are likely to have within the current American health
care system. For the purposes of this Article, they can be viewed as
hypotheses that warrant further empirical study.
First, patients have a variety of expectations about their
relationships with physicians. For some patients, these might be
called "autonomy expectations-that is, expectations of care that
responds to their choices.1 3 For others, they are expectations of
paternalistic care-that is, of care that is aimed at protecting their
best interests. These expectations frequently arise from experience
within the health care system-for example, through the establishment of a particular provider-patient relationship of an ongoing and
relatively longstanding nature. Expectations about provider-patient
relationships might include: that one will be able to continue to
receive treatment from the same provider, that one will be able to
choose other providers, or that one will be able to seek referrals to
specialists. At least some expectations of continued care find legal
support in the doctrine that physicians may not abandon their
patients. 14 It is important to note the extent to which these
expectations are rooted in experience with the current system of
health care in the United States; by comparison, patients in the
United Kingdom generally do not expect to be able to shop around
for other general practitioners or to seek specialist care on their
own.

15

Patients may also have expectations of autonomy or paternalism
about the extent and nature of shared decisionmaking within
provider-patient relationships. As the doctrine of informed consent
has gained wider currency, patients may expect to be informed
about risks and alternatives to proposed care, and to be educated
about the risks of not seeking care. 16 Patients who have gone to
13 See Grahame Feletti et al., PatientSatisfaction with Primar-CareConsultations, 9
J. BEHAV. MED. 389, 397-98 (1986) (attempting to correlate patient expectations with
patient satisfaction).
14 See e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (outlining physicians'

obligations with respect to continuing treatment and withdrawal).
15

See, e.g., THoMAs HALPER, THE MISFORTUNES OF OTHERS: END STAGE RENAL
DISEASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 97-105 (1989) (discussing the "docility of the British
patient").
16 Legal obligations now accompany some of these expectations. See, e.g.,
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir.) (holding physicians to a
reasonable patient standard of informed consent), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906-08 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the right of
informed refusal requires disclosure of the risks of forgoing care). There are many
discussions of the significance of these changes in the law of informed consent; for
the suggestion that physicians should clarify expectations about informed consent,
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the trouble and thought of executing advance directives or specifications about organ donation may expect that their wishes will be
honored by providers and by family members.17 At the same time,
from a more traditional perspective, patients may expect caring and
paternalism.' 8 Many patients probably also expect confidentiality
19
and undivided loyalty on the part of their health care providers.
Another set of expectations that patients have might be termed
"expectations of the likelihood of success." Patients may have
expectations about what medical care will be provided and what that
care can or cannot do for them. American health law has fostered
expectations through written contracts, for example, a plastic
surgeon who promised a beautiful nose to an aspiring actress, 20 or
a surgeon who promised an easy cure for a peptic ulcer.21 More
frequently, expectations about what care can do remain unarticulated premises in the provider-patient encounter.
Commentators
often note that Americans expect a great deal from technology, in
contrast with the British who remain far more skeptical about what
technology can achieve. 22 Other patients may expect that nothing

see, for example, Jerry A. Green, Minimizing MalpracticeRisks by Role Clarification:
The Confusing Transitionfrom Tort to Contract, 109 ANNALs OF INTERNAL MED. 234,
235-36 (1988) (arguing that roles and responsibilities of both physician and patient
should be clarified expressly to avoid later tort disputes).
17 State statutes governing the creation of advance directives may provide that it
is unprofessional conduct to fail to honor a directive. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1112(3) (Supp. 1991) (stating that "[f]ailure of an attending physician... to
comply with a directive ... constitutes unprofessional conduct").
18 FranzJ. Ingelfinger's Arrogance, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1507, 1509-10 (1980),
laments the ways in which a medical ethic of autonomy appears to brush aside
expectations of being cared for.
19 Arguments that professionals have obligations of confidentiality frequently
presume that clients will not feel free to seek fully effective advice unless confidentiality is assured. See Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1469-74 (1966).
There appear to be no controlled studies, however, that have assessed the importance
of confidentiality to consultation in either law or medicine. For a defense of
confidentiality that does not presume clients' expectations, see Bruce M. Landesman,
Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAwYER' ETHics 191 (David Luban ed., 1984).
20 See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 184-85 (Mass. 1973).
21 See Guilmet v. Campbell, 188 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Mich. 1971).
22 See; e.g., HALPER, supra note 15, at 101 ("Less likely to complain, the British
patient may be more likely to accept ... his illness ... ."); cf RUDOLF KLEIN, THE
POLTICS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 133 (1983) ("[I]nternational comparisons
do not suggest that greater expenditure automatically leads to better health.., and
it is at least arguable that the improvement in the health of the nation would be
greater if extra resources were, for example, devoted to better housing."). One very
interesting longitudinal study of five family practices in London suggests that patients
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can be done for them and delay seeking care as a result; in some
lower socioeconomic groups, for example, the tendency is to regard
aches and pains as an ineluctable part of the aging process rather
23
than as symptoms worthy of medical attention.
Expectations about available medical treatments and likely
outcomes come from a potpourri of sources: popular culture,
gossip, magazines, self-help books, and other mass media. They also
come from the medical profession itself, as new interventions such
as coronary bypass surgery or, now, balloon angioplasty are
heralded publicly as dramatic improvements in care. Expectations
also come secondhand, as patients share information about what
their different doctors have told them. As it becomes further
developed and better known, the movement toward practice
standards and consensus conferences, now largely motivated by
concerns about quality and cost, 24 may extend patient expectations
still further with respect to the forms of care they receive and likely
outcomes.
Perhaps the most important set of patient expectations for
purposes of this study are expectations about economic access to
medical services. Patients have expectations about the extent to
which their care will be paid for by insurance or other sources. In
the United States, these expectations are largely employmentrelated. Generous health benefits are surely incentives to many
both expected more than they got (only 57% of those who had expected physical
examinations actually received them) and got more than they expected (48% of those
who had not expected prescriptions were given them). See MARGOT JEFFERYS &
HEssIE SACHS, RETHINKING GENERAL PRACTICE: DILEMMAs IN PRIMARY MEDICAL CARE

287 (1983).
23 see, e.g., Jones, supra note 11, at 85 (noting that many elderly people in low
socioeconomic areas suffer from symptoms for which no help is sought because of
the incorrect belief that the symptoms are merely part of the aging process).
24 For discussion of practice standards, see, for example, Ellison C. Pierce,Jr., The
Development of Anesthesia Guidelines and Standards, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 61-64
(1990) (discussing early and recent standards for anesthesiologists); Michele L.
Robinson, Medical PracticeStandards: HCFAJoins the Fray, HosPrrALs, Dec. 5, 1988,
at 18 (1988) (discussing the Health Care Financing Administration's approach to
medical practice standards). For discussion of consensus conferences, see, for
example,Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consensus
Development Programon PhysicianPractice,258JAMA 2708-13 (1987) (concluding that
the consensus development conference is an important educational tool the effect of
which could be enhanced by focusing on practice areas that need improvement and

by encouraging follow-up programs); Paul M. Wortman et al., Do Consensus Conferences
Work? A ProcessEvaluation of the NIH Consensus Development Program, 13 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 469, 469-98 (1988) (identifying problems and suggesting modifications of the NIH Consensus Development Program three-day conferences).

1888

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:1881

peoples' choices of employers or even occupations. For example,
both job security and the relative stability of health benefits have
been offered as important incentives to employment in the public
sector. Job mobility is discouraged significantly when employees
who have employment-based insurance must risk insurance
exclusions when they shift to new employers. 25 Expectations of
job-related insurance may start with employment contracts; but they
may not be limited to explicit contractual terms. Benefits contracts,
for example, typically extend for limited periods, one to three years
at most. Nevertheless, many employees throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s experienced almost automatic renewal or moderate
changes in their benefits. These employees may have come to
expect the continuation of their employment benefits in roughly the
same form as long as their employment continued, although they
had no written contractual rights to the continuation. Some
employers have used this continued availability of26 benefits to
encourage employee loyalty and longevity of service.
Retirement benefits are another area in which expectations may
extend beyond explicit contractual commitments. Promises to
continue to pay health insurance premiums, particularly before
Medicare eligibility begins, have been used as inducements for early
retirement; a hotly-litigated issue has been the extent to which these
promises can be modified in light of rising insurance costs.27 The
willingness to engage in hazardous occupations may provide other
examples, especially if the employer (or other insurers, including
25 See, e.g., Paul Cotton, PreexistingConditions 'HoldAmericans Hostage'to Employers
and Insurance, 265 JAMA 2451-53 (1991) (quoting Blue Cross spokesperson Julie
Boyle as stating that "[p]reexisting condition clauses 'cause a lot of people to hang
onto jobs because they're scared that if they switch they will go uncovered for a
period of time for the condition they have'").
26 For example, beginning in 1939, National Life and Accident Insurance
Company established insurance programs for its agents and employees. From the
1940s until the 1970s, National Life used "paid up" retirement medical insurance
benefits as a significant tool for recruiting and retaining agents. When National Life
was acquired by American General Corporation in 1982, however, the costs of
maintaining retiree benefit levels appeared increasingly problematic. American
General successfully relied on reserved rights of contractual modification to slash the
retirees' "paid up" benefits. See Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483,
1486 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd, 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1020 (1989).
27 See, e.g., id. at 1486 (upholding employer's termination and modification of
retirement benefits to employees who had left active employment); Marjorie M. Kress,
Benefit Vesting in Employee Health Plans,24 ToRT & INS. L.J. 88 (1988) (discussing ways
to minimize benefit vesting claims).
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society) makes promises about the availability of care in the case of
injury. Sometimes these promises too are overtly contractual, as in
examples of sports contracts that promise continued medical care
for injured players.
Physicians likewise have expectations about medical care,
expectations that interact with the expectations of their patients.
Physicians' expectations are formed largely in training and in
practice. On the level of interactions with patients, some physicians
may expect to be largely in control of the relationship; others may
expect to function with the patient as partner. 28 There may well
be generational differences here. Some physicians may expect little
beyond pay from patients in return for continuing the care-giving
relationship, while others may, in certain circumstances, not even
expect to collect their fees. Some physicians may expect to receive
compliance from patients and to be able to dismiss or refer patients
29
who do not follow their orders.
Of crucial importance to this Article is the degree to which
physicians expect the physician-patient relationship to be insulated
from financial and other third party pressures. In certain practice
settings, the expectation may be that treatment decisions are
increasingly dictated by managerial policy."0 In this and other
ways, the intrusion of third party judgments into physicians'
decisions about patient care may be perceived as disrupting
28Jay Katz's study of communication between doctors and their patients is as
much about physicians' expectations as it is about the expectations of patients. See
JAY 2KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCT OR AND PATIENT (1984).
9
American physicians can terminate relationships with their patients, provided
they give the patients notice that is adequate enough to allow them to seek alternative
care. See, e.g., Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. App. 1982) (noting that
physician who abandons a patient may do so only after having provided notice and
ample opportunity to seek other medical care). Payton was a dialysis patient who
continued to be disruptive and noncompliant despite frequent warnings. The case
appears to be the only reported example in which the court countenanced cessation
of care despite the recognition that the patient had been unable to find an alternative.
In the end, the patient agreed to inpatient psychiatric treatment and had dialysis
continued. It is more difficult in the United Kingdom for physicians to rearrange
care for their patients; one study of family practice physicians in London suggests that
occasionally referrals to specialists occur because general practitioners cannot "fire"
patients, but need relief from some patients whom they find difficult, recalcitrant, or
unresponsive. SeeJEFFERYS & SACHS, supra note 22, at 53.
30 For a discussion of the possibility that public or corporate policy might
constrain physician behavior, see, for example, Paul Campbell & Nancy M. Kane,
Physician-ManagementRelationships at HCA: A Case Study, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 591, 601-04 (1990) (analyzing effect of corporate and public ownership of
hospitals on the physician-patient relationship).
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physicians' expectations about trust and independentjudgment. At
least part of physician resentment of the increase in malpractice
litigation and of the need to justify care to third party payers may
stem from physicians' sentiment that their judgment has come
under fire in ways that are both unexpected and undeserved.
Physicians surely also have expectations about important aspects of
the working conditions they will face: the ability to arrange calls,
the difficulties of running a small business, or the ability to maintain
an independent practice with privileges at several hospitals.
Like patients, physicians also may have expectations about what
medical care can accomplish. These expectations may play a major
role in the kinds of innovative therapies they encourage patients to
pursue-for example, bone marrow transplantation for advanced
breast cancer.3 1 Physicians' expectations of success, while rooted
in technology and controlled studies, may outstrip what data are
32
available.
Physicians surely also have expectations about income levels.
These expectations may have affected choices about practice
specialties. Primary care specialists in general have lower projected
incomes than surgical specialists; recent controversy about calculating physician reimbursement under Medicare by means of a
"resource relative value scale" reflected reactions to the possibility
33
of changes in this balance.
Finally, just as few studies have examined patient and physician
expectations independently of one another, there has been little
study of the extent to which physicians' expectations are congruent
with those of their patients.
SI See, e.g., Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661,677 (D. Md. 1991)

(holding that high dosage chemotherapy combined with autologous bone marrow
transplant was not experimental treatment for breast cancer and was covered by

health plan).
32 A pathbreaking sociological study of physicians' expectations about care is
RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL:

A SOCIAL VIEW OF

ORGAN TRANSPLANTs AND DIALYsIs (1974). Jay Katz's work also describes the
difficulty physicians have in admitting uncertainty, even to themselves. See KATZ,
supra note 28, at 165-206.

33 See, e.g., William C. Hsiao et al., EstimatingPhysicians'Workfora Resource-Based
Relative-Value Scale, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 835, 835-41 (1988) (describing a resource
based relative-value scale as an alternative to a payment system based on charges for
physician services); William C. Hsiao et al., Resource-Based Relative Values: An
Overview, 260 JAMA 2347, 2347-444 (1988) (discussing policy and development of

resource-based relative value scales).
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The argument of this Article is not that all, or even any, of these
expectations have moral weight. Indeed, there are no doubt major
conflicts among some of these expectations; not all of them can be
realized consistently. Frustration with changes in the current system
of American medical care may well reflect some of these conflicts;
even affluent doctors and affluent patients cannot get all that they
have come to expect. If for no other reason than likely political
acceptance, however, it is important to consider which, if any, of
these expectations have moral weight, and what kind of moral
weight they have. Does any of this present panoply of expectations
of physicians and patients matter morally? Is their disappointment
morally problematic? Should they be taken into account in the
analysis or design of changes in our system of health care? These
are large issues and the discussion which follows only begins to
investigate them.
II. THE MORAL WEIGHT OF EXPECTATIONS

This Section presents a brief account of why expectations might
have moral significance. On many views of morality, individual
autonomy is taken to have moral significance; and expectations are
related to autonomy, in the following way. Part of what is involved
in treating people autonomously is respecting their ability to make
choices and undertake plans. 3 4 If expectations are ignored
altogether, individuals will not have minimally stable contexts within
which to plan, or minimal assurance that their plans will be taken
seriously. The importance of planning does not mean that all
expectations are significant, or that expectations matter conclusively
in settling issues of social justice. As Robert Nozick pointed out in
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, wishing does not make it morally so; the

expectations of some are not traps that ensnare others whatever
they do.3 5 Expectations do not, can not, and should not redefine
underlying realities. Nonetheless, if people are to be taken seriously
as choosers and planners, it is important at least to open up the
question of whether expectations matter morally under some
circumstances, and why they do.

3 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAucHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESs, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHIcs 67-119 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the principle of autonomy);JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJUSTICE 513-20 (1971) (discussing autonomy and objectivity).
35 See ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 268-71 (1974).
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Here are some features of expectations that are relevant to
morals. First of all, expectations are based on beliefs about the
future ("base beliefs"). The more unreasonable are base beliefs, the
less moral weight they carry. People should not be encouraged to
build their houses on quicksand, and then rewarded when they do.
Base beliefs might be unreasonable because they are known or
suspected to be false, or because they are known to lack the kind of
support that might reasonably be called upon in favor of that type
of belief. For example, a belief in the efficacy of a therapeutic
modality that has either no, or highly suspect, scientific support
would be an unreasonable base belief.
One of the most difficult problems here is that the reasonableness of beliefs is dependent on context. That is, the reasonableness
of a belief rests on the support that is available to a given person at
a given time, rather than on the inherent truth or falsity of the
belief. Thus, if well-designed studies have confirmed the efficacy of
a therapy, it is reasonable for physicians to believe that the therapy
is efficacious. If there are no confirming studies, or if new studies
question earlier findings, these beliefs about efficacy diminish in
reasonableness. Lay beliefs about the efficacy of therapy may be
reasonable if they have been based on efforts to seek out appropriate expert advice, even when the advice is in turn not adequately
supported. But lay beliefs about efficacy are not reasonable if they
are based on desperate hopes for cures despite explicit advice that
there is nothing more to be done.
Encouragement is a second feature that favors giving expectations some moral weight. Without the acknowledgement that it is
sometimes reasonable to rely on assurances that expectations will be
fulfilled, much planning would be undercut. Encouragement
includes promising or leading someone on, but it also reaches to
failures to disabuse someone of beliefs where a disclaimer would
ordinarily be expected. For example, an employer can encourage
an employee to believe that her employment will not be affected by
her expensive health needs by reassuring her outright that she "will
always have a job as long as he's in charge." Or, an employer can
encourage an employee by failing to tell her that her job is in
jeopardy in situations in which these concerns would normally be
articulated (i.e. a review of employee benefits utilization that is
specifically directed to issues of overutilization and its burdens for
the employer). To take a similar pair of examples, some employers
have encouraged employees contemplating retirement to count on
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continued health insurance benefits.8 6 Others have simply failed
to disabuse employees of these expectations, even in response to
87
inquiries.
Like the reasonableness of belief, the reasonableness of reliance
is context-dependent. Encouragement matters particularly when it
comes from a privileged source such as an employer or a physician,
a source on whom it is reasonable to rely with respect to the matter
in question. We rely on experts when they recommend courses of
action, employers when they make assurances of job security, and
family members when they say they will help carry out our wishes.
In addition to the source, other features of the situation may
also contribute to the reasonableness of reliance. The longer the
encouragement persists, the more reasonable the reliance. Diversity
of sources may also be a factor; some of the most persistent
expectations about health care are encouraged by a wide range of
different sources, often cumulatively:
individual physicians,
physicians' organizations, Office of Technology Assessment reports,
employers, insurance companies, the Department of Health and
Human Services or state health departments, the Center for Disease
Control, gossip among neighbors, the popular press, and dozens
more.
Encouragement raises complex issues of moral responsibility and
legal liability. For example, should encouragers ever be viewed as
morally responsible for the disappointment of the expectations they
foster? If so, should responsibility be limited to primary encouragers or should others who have played supporting roles be called
upon to help satisfy encouraged expectations? Should encouragement be the basis for legal liability only in the context of antecedent
legal obligations (those created by statutory duties, employment
contracts, or the common law of provider-patient relationships)?
Or, should reliance interests more broadly be the basis of legal
liability and, if so, where should limits be drawn? Is there an
argument for assigning the government a special role with respect
to encouragement, when expectations are generated from a wide
range of sources, or are in effect culturally generated? The
36

See e.g., Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 910-14 (6th Cir. 1988)

(upholding employer's termination and modification of retirement benefits to
employees
who had left active employment), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
3
7 See, e.g., Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1290-92 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding unlawful employer's decision to deny health benefits to retirees even though
they had assumed that the benefits would be available and had written inquiries to
the employer stating this belief prior to their retirement).

1894

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:1881

concluding section of this Article suggests that the fragility of some
reasonable expectations, the difficulty of assigning responsibility for
their encouragement, and the frequent lack of resources even when
lines of responsibility can be established, are important parts of the
current case for publicly supported, universal health care in the
United States.
Another feature that counts in favor of according expectations
moral weight is their connection to the fabric of an individual's life,
to the individual's sense of who she is and what her aims are. These
expectations are likely to be both deeply felt and especially
important to the realization of future goals. Physicians' expectations of being able to deliver good quality medical care, and of
being able to act with integrity in the interests of their patients, are
examples of expectations that are important to their conceptions of
who they are and what they want to become. Similarly, patients'
expectations that they will continue to receive care such as rehabilitation has an important impact on the exercise of capacities and the
perceived quality of life.
The discussion to this point has ignored any connection between
8
expectations and an underlying theory of moral rights or justice.
Some expectations are generated in reliance on conditions that are
just; others under conditions of injustice. The expectations of white
South Africans about continued protection of apartheid or the
property expectations of a slave owner might be examples of
expectations that are generated under conditions of such injustice,
and with such understanding and complicity in that injustice that
they bear no moral force whatsoever. However, it does not follow
that we should give no moral weight to any expectations that arise
under conditions of imperfect justice, although the injustice of a
background situation may diminish the moral weight of the
expectations it generates. Moreover, the desirability of correcting
injustice is an argument for overriding expectations that stand in
the way of movement towards a more just state of affairs.
Nonetheless, expectations that arise under conditions of less
than perfect justice give rise to some of the most difficult moral
dilemmas we have about the funding of health care today. 3 9 For
example, consider the scenario in which health care benefits have
been promised in exchange for early retirement, but keeping that
This point was suggested to me by Allen Buchanan.
" Rawls calls moral theory about situations of less than perfect justice "partial

38

compliance" theory. See RAWLS, supra note 34, at 8.
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promise conflicts with keeping promises to other workers or society
in general by, for example, forcing the employer to forego investment in expensive pollution control equipment. Here, the promise
provides a moral argument for the expectation; the expectation is
probably also reasonable, encouraged, and relatively important to
the individual's well-being, particularly if she is not yet eligible for
Medicare or has health needs that are not well covered by Medicare.
On the other hand, the retirement promises may have been
improvident or far more generous than was justifiable on the basis
of considerations of justice, such as the employee's prior contributions or fairness to other generations of employees. As the
conclusion to this Article suggests, an argument for universal health
care is that it is a compromise solution to this dilemma. Under
proposals for universal care, retirees would not be totally dependent
on their former employers for health care benefits, although they
might get less generous benefits under a universal system than they
had originally been promised.
As another illustration of the moral conflicts raised by background injustice, consider a young adult with expensive, chronic
health needs, including anticipated eventual transplant surgery. His
wealthy parents have been able to meet his needs to date, and plan
also to pay for the transplant. Yet there is some question about the
justice of the underlying distribution of wealth or about the parents'
manner of acquiring their wealth. A "one-tier" system of universal
health care, which did not pay for the transplant at issue because it
had determined that other needs such as prenatal care were more
pressing, and which did not allow for the private purchase of
additional care, would disappoint the young man's expectation that
his transplant will be paid for by his parents. There is real moral
tension here. On the one hand, the expectation may be longstanding, encouraged, crucial to survival, and based on a conception of
parental obligations. It may have played a role in the young man's
plans about his future-for example, what kind of lifespan and
capacities he has expected to enjoy. The expectations of a funded
transplant may have seemed reasonable under the current mixture
of American health policy. On the other hand, it might not have
been reasonable for the young man to expect social policy to
continue to permit him to be the recipient of his parents' largesse.
And there are certainly arguments of justice both against allowing
people to continue to benefit from certain forms of unjust wealth
distribution and against a health care system that permits wide
differences between what is publicly funded and what can be
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purchased privately. These more general considerations of justice
may outweigh the patient's expectations that his parents will be
allowed to pay for continued care.
To see how complex this dilemma is, compare this scenario
about the young man with two other related scenarios. The first
variation is a scenario in which organs are sold to the highest
bidder, and the young man expects to have a very good chance of
getting an organ because his parents are quite wealthy. In this
scenario, the considerations of justice are surely strong enough to
outweigh the young man's expectations. The second variation is a
scenario in which the young man's parents were suddenly to tell him
that they would not pay for the transplant because they had decided
their money would be better spent on a charitable contribution to
prenatal care. Here, additional moral support is lent to the young
man's expectations if parents have moral obligations to support
their adult children who are in medical need. 40 His parents may
also have encouraged him in very direct ways and there may have
been no reason whatsoever for him to have guessed they were likely
to change their minds about paying for his care. Although the
reasons of abstract justice that favor prenatal care are just as strong
as they were in the argument about the allocation of resources by
society, there are no special reasons to think that the parents have
obligations to ensure good prenatal care. But there are reasons to
think that the parents have obligations to care for their son, and so
in this case we might conclude that the son's expectations override
the more general concern for social justice.
Even if one could argue that it would be morally problematic to
disappoint certain expectations, it does not follow that we are
locked in, morally, to the status quo. The need for change might be
important enough to override the disappointed expectations. But
the expectations might still bear some moral weight in how we
shape the change. For example, the introduction of a system of
universal health insurance might phase changes in gradually,
grandfathering certain existing claims, or allowing a parallel
voluntary system to continue. Changes might be introduced only
40

There has been a great deal of recent discussion about the moral significance

of special relationships. See, e.g.,

THoMAs NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE

165

(1986) ("Most people would acknowledge a noncontractual obligation to show special
concern for [parents, children, spouses, siblings, fellow members of a community or
even a nation]."). But there has been little discussion about the interrelationships
between special relationships and expectations.
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after extensive public discussion of which expectations should
continue to be fulfilled, and which expectations are unrealistically
high. The possibility of compensating those who are especially
dislocated by changes might also be considered.4 1
To summarize, reasonableness, encouragement, longevity,
integrity, and consistency with an underlying theory of rights and
justice all provide support for the recognition of expectations.
Conversely, unreasonableness, overt discouragement, transitoriness,
relative lack of importance, and background injustice all count
against according expectations any weight.
In light of these factors, a relatively strong moral case can be
made for some of the expectations described in the preceding
section. For example, consider an employee such as Robert Musto,
who for years was encouraged to stay with National Life Insurance
Company by promises of retirement insurance benefits. 42 If
benefit levels are low or moderate in comparison to employerprovided health benefits generally, as they were in the Musto case,
these expectations are arguably reasonable, even in today's context
of decline. As announced selling points for employment, retiree
benefits are employer-encouraged-despite unheralded disclaimers
in the actual benefits contract that the employer reserves the right
to make changes unilaterally. These expectations may well be
longstanding and crucial to the employee enjoyment of a minimum
quality of life. Moreover, if the expectations are moderate, they are
consistent with background justice at least to the extent that they do
not lay claim to an unfair share of social resources.
Or consider the nearly 120,000 retired coal mine workers and
their families who are insured under a fund established as part of
the settlement of the bitter national coal strike in 1946. 4a The
fund is now over $100 million in debt.44 The retired miners insist
that part of what encouraged them to stay in the mines was the
promise of retirement benefits. Yet at the present time, so many
41 See Leslie Pickering Francis, Expectationsand the Designof a UniversalHealthCare
System, in NATIONAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 209, 220-30 (discussing proposals for
universal
health care).
42
See Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1486-88 (M.D. Tenn.
1985),
rev'd, 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
4
3 See Keith White, Gov. Caperton Urges Governors to ProtectMiners Health Benefits,

GANNETT NEWS SERv., Feb. 2, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
44 See STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 1ST SESs., BACKGROUND
ON RETIRED COAL MINERs' HEALTH BENEFITs (JCX-18-91) (1991), reprintedin DAILY
REP. EXECUTIVs (BNA), Sept. 25, 1991, at L-19, L-19.
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companies have gone out of business and so many others are
uneconomical that only twenty-five percent of mining companies are
supporting the benefit fund for the remainder. 45 The retired
miners' expectations of the continuation of at least moderate levels
of benefits are surely reasonable, encouraged, integral to their lives,
and consistent with background justice. Yet unless federal support
46
is forthcoming, these expectations are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Other expectations described in the earlier section may be less
persuasive in comparison to these examples. Expectations that
there is always some new therapy to be tried, and that health care
can conquer death if therapeutic attempts are sufficiently persistent,
are unreasonable. Expectations that employers will continue to
fund benefits at current levels, despite loudly announced and
persistent disclaimers rather than silent and unnoticed ones, are not
encouraged. If these expectations have moral weight, it must rest
on considerations of justice independent of encouraged reliance.
Expectations of very high levels of benefits, particularly those that
transfer wealth from already less affluent to more affluent sectors
of society, are not consistent with background justice and lack moral
weight on this account.
Of course, in the real world of employee benefits, things are not
always as clear cut as these examples might suggest. Consider the
story of Kathryn Reilly. 47 Mrs. Reilly and her husband wanted a
biological child badly enough to seek out extensive infertility care.
Mr. Reilly, a public school teacher, had Blue Cross coverage that
excluded "[s]ervices and procedures which are experimental/
investigative in nature ... [and] any treatment.., not yet recognized as accepted medical practice by Blue Cross."4" In 1984, Mrs.
Reilly underwent successful in vitro fertilization. Nearly a year later,
Blue Cross denied her $3000 claim for the procedure on the ground
that it was experimental in nature because it had less than a fifty
percent success rate. 49 The Reillys argued that their expectations
that the care would be funded were reasonable and encouraged
under the Blue Cross agreement: in vitro fertilization had been
45 See Keith White, FundsShrinkingforMinerBenefits,GANNETr NEWS SERV., Sept.
25, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexs Library, GNS File.
46 See Marjorie Cortez, Retired Miners Fear They'll Lose Health Benefits, DESERET
NEws, Jan. 11, 1992, at B1, B2.
47 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
48 Id. at 419.
49 See id. at 422-23.
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presented to them by their physicians as an accepted treatment for
infertility, and Blue Gross had not said anything to indicate that
they would deny the claim during the time the policy was in
effect. 50 Blue Cross argued, on the other hand, that in vitro
fertilization was not recognized as standard therapy, and that the
Reillys had been encouraged only by their physicians, experts in
infertility care, who wanted to further acceptance of the innova51
tion.
The Reillys' desires for a biological child were arguably central
to their lives as they saw them. On the other hand, these desires
would be viewed as less compelling if the goals of health care are
taken to be relieving pain and preserving quality of life.5 2 Finally,

whether payment for in vitro fertilization is an unjust demand in a
system that does not fund any health care for over thirty-one million
people 53 is surely controversial. These kinds of disputes about the
moral weight of expectations figure centrally in the legal cases that
challenge denials of health care funding.
III. CURRENT LEGAL TRENDS AND THE LIMITED
PROTECTION OF EXPECTATIONS

The topics discussed in this Section are important sources of
contemporary legal development, but they are by no means the only
areas of health care in which expectations receive limited legal
protection. First, employer-provided health benefit plans are largely
governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).5 4 ERISA protects expectations to the extent they
are memorialized in written benefits contracts; it has effectively
forestalled state statutory or common law efforts to extend the
protection of expectations beyond contractual terms. 55 The result
is that expectations about benefits that are otherwise reasonable,
encouraged by unwritten employer assurances or perhaps by silence,
50 See id. at 420.

" See id. at 427 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting) ("As it happens [the
Reilly's] physicians are specialists in the treatment of fertility and naturally wanted to
encourage the use of an exciting and promising treatment.").
52 For example, the Oregon proposal categorizes in vitro fertilization as "services
valuable to certain individuals," and assigns it a relatively low priority as a result. See
Orejon Basic Health Services Program, in Dougherty, supra note 3, app. at 10.
See supra note 2.
54 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)).
55 See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
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important to peoples' lives, and consistent with background justice,
receive little if any legal protection.
Second, job loss as a result of ill-health or expensive health care
needs is another significant threat to expectations of continued
health benefits. Under federal law, discharged employees enjoy an
eighteen-month grace period during which they can continue group
health benefits at their own expense. 5 6 However, these continuation rights do not protect employees against an employer's decision
to cease to provide health benefits to any employees, or to reduce
drastically the level of health benefits. Third, insurers' decisions to
pull out of entire markets are another very important threat to the
stability of health insurance. There is very little that can be done
under current law to challenge these decisions. Thus employees
who may have thought they could count on health benefits may find
that in several important areas they cannot, and that the law gives
them limited protection when these expectations are not met.
A. ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is a
comprehensive federal effort to protect workers from underfunded,
poorly managed, or illusory pension plans. 57 ERISA also governs
employee welfare benefit plans-that is, benefit plans other than
pensions, including health benefits. 58 Although ERISA sets out
extensive standards for the vesting and funding of pension plans, it
59
has no comparable substantive standards for welfare plans.
Indeed, courts have viewed Congress as explicitly intending through
ERISA to grant employers wide flexibility in developing their nonpension benefit plans. 60 ERISA protection of employee health
benefits rests solely on notice 61 and reporting requirements 62 and
56 See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
57 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
58

See id. § 1002(1).

59 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985)
("[ERISA] does not regulate the substantive content of welfare-benefit plans.").

60 Se e.g., Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir.) ("Welfare
benefit plan administrators ... are explicitly exempted.., from the obligations of
the participation and vesting sections and the funding sections of the Act."), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990); In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th
Cir. 1986) ("Congress expressly exempted employee welfare benefit plans from
stringent vesting, participation, and funding requirements.").
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).

62 See id. § 1021(b).
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on the requirement that the plan be administered by a designated
fiduciary. 63 With respect to the creation of employee expectations, perhaps the most important of these ERISA requirements are
64
that any health benefit plan be set out in a written instrument
and that employees be provided with periodic summaries of the
plan's provisions. These summaries may recede into relatively
distant reminders, however: they are required initially, with updates
every five years thereafter if there have been plan changes, and
65
republication every tenth year if there have been no changes.
ERISA also requires that employees be given notice of changes in
the plan 66 and have access to the full written description of the
67
plan if they so desire.
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of ERISA for
employee health benefits has been its pre-emption of state regulation of employee benefit plans, both pension plans and other
employee welfare plans. Quite simply, ERISA preempts any state
law that relates to employee benefit plans. 6 8 The United States
Supreme Court has construed this preemption language expansively,
to include any state regulation that "relates to" benefit plans in any
way, rather than more narrowly to include only state regulation that
might impinge on the core protective aims of ERISA. 69 Thus,
common law tort and contract suits challenging refusals to pay
benefits "relate to" benefit plans. 70 So do suits alleging that an
employee was wrongfully discharged for utilizing employer-provided
insurance benefits. 71 So do state statutes prohibiting insurers from
requiring employees to make reimbursement when they receive
72
third party repayment for claims.
63 See id. § 1102(a).

64 See
65 See
66 See
67 See
68 See

id. § 1102(a)(1).
id. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b)(1).
id. § 1024(b)(1).
id. § 1024(b)(2).
id. § 1144(a).

69 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) ("The pre-emption
clause is conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal
concern the subject of every state law that 'relates to' an employee benefit governed
by ERISA." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a))).
70 See e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (holding that
"[t]here is no dispute that the common law causes of action asserted in Dedeaux's
complaint 'relate to' an employee benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA[]").
," See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483 (1990) (finding
that employee's discharge because of failure to contribute to a pension fund created
a cause of action that related to an ERISA plan).
72 See e.g., FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 408-11 (1990) (holding that a Pennsylvania
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Despite its preemption of state law relating to benefits plans,
ERISA contains a "savings clause" which exempts state law that
"regulates insurance" from ERISA preemption. 73 This "savings
clause," has been construed broadly by the United States Supreme
Court, in a challenge to state mandated-benefit laws.7 4 Applying
what it characterizes as a "common-sense" understanding of laws
regulating insurance, the Court concluded that Massachusetts'
mandated inclusion of minimum mental health benefits in insurance
contracts was not preempted by ERISA, at least as applied to
contracts purchased by employers for their employees in the general
insurance market. 75 Subsequent cases quickly concluded that the
common-sense understanding of insurance regulation did not
76
extend beyond state regulation aimed specifically at insurance.
The insurance exemption does not save more general tort and
contract doctrines that might be applied to insurance relationships,
such as the availability of punitive damages for bad faith refusals to
77
make good on contract claims.

antisubrogation law was preempted by ERISA).
73 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
74 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
75 See id. at 740-41.
76 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987) ("A commonsense view of the word 'regulates' would lend to the conclusion that in order to
regulate insurance, a law must notjust have an impact on the insurance industry, but
must be specifically directed toward that industry.").
77 See id. at 47-57. For a particularly detailed recent application of Pilot Life,
developing the distinction between general state law and laws regulating insurance,
see International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.
1991). Larry Smith had purchased major medical insurance from Trans Pacific and
its successor New York Life, under a multi-employer trust pooling the resources of
small employers. As a result of an automobile accident, Smith's son became a mute
quadriplegic requiring 24-hour nursing care. Some time later, New York Life
canceled the group policy. Kentucky law forbids the cancellation of an insurance
policy once liability has attached, see id. at 299; New York Life claimed that ERISA
preempted the Kentucky prohibition, see id. The Sixth Circuit held that ERISA
preempted any claims based on general Kentucky law: the Kentucky common law of
contracts, any tort claims for bad faith claims denials, and any claims based on
Kentucky statutes prohibiting unfair trade practices as incorporated into the
insurance code. See id. at 299-300. One of Smith's claims did survive under the
savings clause, however: the claim based on Kentucky statutes governing the terms
of conversion policies issued by successor insurers was held to be a law directly
regulating insurance under the savings clause. See id. at 300-01. Now ask: Should
Larry Smith's ability to continue to receive insurance coverage for his son's
catastrophic care depend on whether regulation of conversion policies is part of
"insurance law," narrowly construed? Is this what Larry Smith might have thought
about when he purchased the policies from Trans Pacific and New York Life?
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One other crucial ERISA provision, the "deemer clause,"
extends the reach of preemption still further. Under the "deemer
clause," benefit plans that are self-funded by employers are not
deemed to be in the business of insurance for the "purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." 78 The deemer clause, too, has been broadly construed;
employer-funded plans are exempt not only from state regulation
of the insurance business, but from any state regulation of insurance
79
contracts.
The results of the deemer clause-fully recognized by the
Supreme CourtS--are major disparities between the regulatory
structure that applies to employer-funded benefit plans and the
structure that applies to plans purchased for their employees by
employers in the regular insurance market. The disparities are
absolutely pivotal for the possibilities of reforming American health
policy at the state level. Self-funded plans are not subject to state
laws mandating benefits, whereas commercial insurance contracts
are subject to mandates and may be notably more expensive as a
result. It should not be surprising that by 1991 a significant
proportion of larger employers had moved to self-insuring their
employees' health plans, a move made even easier by the purchase
of reinsurance for claims over a relatively modest amount such as
$50,000.81

ERISA's insulation of self-funded plans from state

regulation has proved a major barrier to states' efforts to extend the
82
scope of the health benefits available to their citizens.
This general structure of ERISA preemption has had notable
effects on litigation challenging employers' decisions that disappoint
employees' expectations about health benefits. Evolving state
common law doctrines have been cut off abruptly in favor of
78 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
79 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 411 (1990); Metropolitan Life, 471

U.S. at 741.
80 See MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 747.
81 Telephone Interview with Thomas Hartford, Staff Attorney, Blue Cross/Blue
Shield
82 of Utah (Feb. 26, 1992).
See Henry Aaron, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S

HEALTH CARE 123 (1991); Robert Huefner, DesigningaHealthCareSystem: Considering
the Need to Know, in NATIONAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 251, 257. The notable
exception is Hawaii, which has received ERISA exemption for programs in effect
before ERISA. See Michael G. Pfefferkorn, Comment, Federal Preemption of State
MandatedHealth InsurancePrograms UnderERISA-The Hawaii PrepaidHealth CareAct

in Perspective, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 339 (1989).
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ERISA's focus on explicit contractual language. These trends are
apparent with respect to both the modification or cancellation of
group benefit plans, and the denial of individual benefit claims.
Their result is that expectations, no matter how morally persuasive,
are increasingly not legally protected unless they are contractually
specified.
1. Modification or Termination of Health Benefit Plans
As retiree health benefit plans have become increasingly
expensive, and as traditional manufacturing industries have faced
economic decline, pressures have mounted to modify or discontinue
benefit plans for retirees, plans that may have existed for decades.
Retiree benefits are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining;
unions representing the current generation of workers have
understandably not been motivated to protect the retired generation
whom they no longer represent. The result has been a series of
cases challenging plan modifications or cancellations, particularly in
the mid-western Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit cases illustrate how
ERISA preemption has moved legal analysis towards the rights
established or reserved in the written benefit contract.
The Sixth Circuit cases began with the closure of Yard-Man's
Jackson, Michigan, plant; the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement covering workers at the plant; and Yard-Man's decision
to terminate retiree health insurance benefits at the end of the
bargaining agreement. 83 The retirees contended that despite the
plant closure they had been promised lifetime health benefits under
the collective bargaining agreement.8 4 The employer claimed that
the bargaining agreement only promised retirement benefits
equivalent to the benefits of active employees, benefits that had
ended with the plant shutdown. 85 The Sixth Circuit applied
traditional principles of contractual interpretation to contrast
explicit durational language in the provisions applying to active
workers with ambiguous language in the provisions applying to
retirees, and to conclude thereby that the agreement did not intend
to limit the retirees' benefits to the duration of the plant's operation.8 6 The Sixth Circuit also pointed out that workers contem-

83 See Local 134, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1478-79 (6th Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
84 See id. at 1480.
85 See id. at 1480-81.

86 See id. at 1480-81.
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plating retirement would insist on lifetime benefits, because they
could not always expect unions to negotiate for them, and because
retiree benefits are "in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such, carry
with them an inference that they continue so long as the prerequi87
site status is maintained."
The Yard-Man decision was initially read as a broad charter for
retiree rights under federal labor law.8 8 But Yard-Man was not an
ERISA case. Soon after Yard-Man, the Sixth Circuit faced the
impact of ERISA preemption on retiree benefits. 9 White Farm
Equipment Company, reorganizing in a bankruptcy proceeding,
sought to reduce expenses by terminating the health benefits it had
offered to its retirees. 90 To justify the cancellation, White Farm
relied on a summary of the benefit plan, which had been given to
employees and which reserved the right to change or discontinue
the plan. 91 The employees sought to invoke a principle of Ohio
common law that retiree benefits vested at retirement and could not
be terminated thereafter. 92 The Sixth Circuit found that ERISA
preempted Ohio law and clearly exempted retiree health benefits
93
from any vesting requirement otherwise imposed by the state.
The White Farm retirees were thus forced to argue that the plan
summary which they had been given was ambiguous and could be
interpreted to establish vested rights to health benefits.94
In cases after White Farm, the Sixth Circuit applied ERISA to
limit retirees to claims based on the interpretation of their written
benefits contracts. For example, Robert Musto and other retired
employees of National Life and Accident Insurance Company, had
brought a class action challenging major reductions in their health
87

Id. at 1482.

88

See e.g., Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1499 (M.D. Tenn.

1985) (holding that Yard-man requires that the terms of agreements "be construed to
avoid nugatory and illusory promises," thus, "an express, unqualified grant of a right,
rejected by an express unqualified reservation" constitutes an illusory right and is
forbidden in the context of retiree benefits), rev'd., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
89 See, e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1187 (6th Cir. 1986)
(examining the impact of ERISA on "an 'assignment and assumption' agreement"
affecting retiree benefits).
9' See id. at 1188.
91 See id. at 1188-89.
92 See id. at 1189.

93 See id. at 1193.
94 The documentary situation was actually quite complex: White Farm employees
had been given several different summaries of their benefits and White Farm had not
produced an overall document describing the plan. See id.
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insurance benefits after National Life was acquired by American
General Corporation. 95 Relying on Yard-Man, the Musto plaintiffs
had succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction from the
district court against the changes in the plan. 96 In reversing the
district court, the Sixth Circuit, following White Farm, relied on
language in the benefit policies reserving the right to change or
terminate the plan. 97 Despite evidence that National Life had
championed its retirement benefits to encourage employee loyalty,
the Sixth Circuit refused to allow the plaintiffs to use evidence of
oral representations to establish that National Life had reached
additional contractual understandings that estopped them from
modifying or terminating retiree health benefits. 98
ERISA's
requirement of a written plan document, the court concluded, was
designed to protect plan participants-employers as well as employees-against the vagaries of oral assurances. 9 Musto did not reach
the issue of whether other written documents provided by the
employer could be relied upon to modify the contractual agreement
00
as found in the employer's description of the health plan.
In its most recent cases applying ERISA preemption to the
modification of benefits plans, the Sixth Circuit has in effect
developed a federal version of the parol evidence rule of contracts.
In Armistead v. Vernitron Corporation,10 1 a group of employees took
early retirement at the time of a plant closure, on the understanding
that they were trading reduced pension benefits for the continuation of their health insurance. They sought to use evidence that
their employer had specifically assured them in benefits seminars
that they would receive the health benefits, to demonstrate that the
apparent reservation of the right to amend benefits found in the
written plan summary did not accurately reflect the parties' actual
agreement.10 2 The Sixth Circuit allowed the retirees to introduce
the evidence extrinsic to the written instrument on the traditional
contract theory that parol evidence is admissible to reform mistaken

95 See Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), rev'd.,
861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
96 See id. at 1498-99, 1505-06; Musto, 861 F.2d at 906-07.
97 See Musto, 861 F.2d at 907.
98 See id. at 909-10.
99 See id. at 910.
100 See id. at 907.
101 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1991)
102 See id. at 1298.
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contractual writings.1 03 In addition, the Sixth Circuit allowed the
retirees to contend alternatively that Vernitron was estopped from
asserting its contractual rights because of the assurances made by its
benefits representatives.1 0 4 But the court in Armistead did not
allow the plaintiffs to use oral evidence to modify the contractual
agreement. Armistead was a remarkably sympathetic case for the
plaintiffs on the facts; they had asked specifically whether their
health benefits would continue in exchange for their reduced
pensions, and had been assured that they would. These facts
allowed the Sixth Circuit to apply the doctrine of reformation,
harkening back to Yard-Man themes of protecting retirees' expectations; but its interpretation of ERISA has limited the use of oral
assurances to the situations in which extrinsic evidence may be
introduced to show that a contract was not really what the writing
makes it seem, and to preempt broader state law theories of reliance
or good faith. The upshot, therefore, is that employers can ensure
that they are legally free to amend or terminate benefit plans by
careful drafting of the written instruments that set out the plans.
The Sixth Circuit has not been alone in refusing to allow assurances
extrinsic to the written benefits contract to be used to modify the
10 5
contractual understanding.
2. ERISA Preemption and Individual Claims
A second important regulatory feature of ERISA as it applies to
employee welfare plans is that it holds plan administrators to the
standards of fiduciaries.10 6 Fiduciary standards apply to decisions
interpreting benefit plans; they are not a back door way to include
substantive guarantees in insurance plans.1 0 7 However, ERISA's
103 See id.

See id. at 1300.
See, e.g., Alday v. Container Corp. of Am., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(refusing to refer to extrinsic communications between the parties' to determine the
parties' intent), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 675 (1991); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871
F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that oral agreements cannot form the basis
of a cause of action under ERISA); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund
v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1154 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding
that oral understandings between the union and the employer that contradict a
written pension plan will not be given effect by the court); Moore v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that absent proof of fraud an
ERISA plan cannot be amended by parol evidence).
104

105

106
107

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988 & Supp. 11989).
See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1331 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining that the

employer may insist on precertification for admission as part of a managed care plan
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fiduciary requirements may subject plan administrators to relatively
strict judicial scrutiny of decisions to deny benefit claims. In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,108 the United States Supreme
Court held that because of the fiduciary obligations of plan
administrators, actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan
interpretations must receive de novo judicial review. 10 9 When the
plan administrator exercises discretionary authority, however,
benefit denials are to be reviewed on the more deferential arbitrary
and capricious standard." 0
The Firestonedecision means that the extent of judicial scrutiny
of decisions to deny benefits will depend on the way in which the
benefits agreement structures the decisionmaking authority of the
plan administrator. For example, the requirement that a plan pay
for "medically necessary treatment" will subject claims denials to de
novo judicial review; but the requirement that a plan pay for
"medically necessary treatment as determined by the plan administrator" will subject denials to review on the more deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard.11 1 The Eleventh Circuit concluded-somewhat reluctantly, it appeared-that this result is
necessary if employers or insurers are to be given the benefit of
112
their bargains.
The extent of discretion conferred on plan administrators has
been especially pivotal in cases challenging decisions to deny
benefits on the ground that the proposed treatment was experimental. In Maryland, for example, several patients with advanced breast
cancer sought coverage from their Blue Cross plans for high dose
and holding that decisions about plan benefits are the employer's prerogative and not
subject to review on the arbitrary and capricious standard that applies to the decisions
of fiduciaries managing ERISA plans); Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943,
949 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d, 897, 912 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989), which held that fiduciary standards do

not apply to plan modifications), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 817 (1990).
108489 U.S. 101 (1989).
See id. at 108, 110.
110 See id. at 111.
109

i1 See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) for the
proposition that there should be de novojudicial review of an ERISA benefits denial
decision "'unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority'"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757
F. Supp. 661, 666 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that de novojudicial review is inappropriate
when specific plan language vests discretionary power in the plan administrator).
112 See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1563.
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113
chemotherapy and autologous bone marrow transplantation.
Their insurance contracts excluded coverage for "'experimental and

investigative'" treatments, defined as "'any treatment ...

not

generally acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suitable
114
medical specialty practicing in Maryland, as decided by us.'"
Blue Cross's decision to deny coverage for bone marrow transplantation in breast cancer patients was based on its own evaluation of
the scientific evidence, not on the opinions of the Maryland
oncological community. 115 Blue Cross argued that, under the
contractual definition of experimental treatment, it had been given
discretion to decide when a treatment was experimental and, thus,
its decision should be reviewed only on the deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard.1 1 6 The district court disagreed, finding the
contractual language ambiguous and concluding that ambiguous
language should trigger more searching judicial review because
117
ERISA fiduciary standards are intended to protect employees.
However, had the contractual language "demonstrate[d] on its face
a clear and unequivocal intent to vest the plan administrator with
discretionary authority," the court would have concluded that it was
limited to review on the arbitrary and capricious standard. 118
The arbitrary and capricious standard does not leave plan
administrators entirely unscrutinized, however. Courts following
Firestonehave found some room to tighten even deferential scrutiny
when the plan administrator's interests conflict with the interests of
the beneficiary. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has developed
case law shifting the burden of proof to the fiduciary to show that
its decision was not self-interested, when the fiduciary stands to
profit financially from the benefits denial. 1 19 And in the Reilly
case described above, 120 the Seventh Circuit held that there were
material issues of' fact about whether the Blue Cross decision to
deny coverage for in vitro fertilization because of its less than fifty
percent success rate had been arbitrary. 12 1 Thus, an insurer or
I's See Adams, 757

F. Supp. at 662-63.
Id. at 663 (quoting Blue Cross benefit plan).
115 See id.
116 See id.
1'7 See id. at 667.
118 Id. at 666.
119 See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (11th Cir.
114

1990) (noting that without such burden shifting the plan beneficiaries would be left
unprotected).
20

See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
121 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 423-24 (7th Cir.
1
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employer can craft plan language to ensure relatively deferential
review of decisions to deny claims, although its decisions may not
be entirely insulated from scrutiny.
B. Job Loss

Another strategy that employers have sought to use when the
costs of health benefits rise precipitously is to seek to discharge
particularly expensive employees. Employees do enjoy some federal
statutory protection from dismissals caused by health needs, but
they are limited. ERISA prohibits discharges in retaliation for
exercising rights under benefit plans.1 22 Thus an employee
cannot be fired because his multiple sclerosis might prove expensive
for his employer's benefit plan.1 23 The fact that a discharge
deprives an employee of the opportunity to enjoy continued
benefits, however, is insufficient by itself to support a retaliatory
discharge claim. 124 In addition, under ERISA employers remain
free to discharge employees for health difficulties that result in
missed work or otherwise affect job performance.
The recent Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)125 may
provide employees with some protection against job loss resulting
from health needs. The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities, although not
to the extent of imposing undue hardships such as significant
expense in light of the employer's financial resources.1 2 6 Whether an ill employee can be discharged because of absenteeism will
thus turn on the degree of hardship imposed on the employer.
Under the ADA, it is also prohibited to discriminate by subjecting
employees to differential fringe benefit contracts because of their
disabilities. 12 7 But the ADA does not guarantee that employees
with high health care expenses will be able to find or continue
employment-based insurance. Employers are permitted to establish
insurance plans that underwrite risks in a manner consistent with
1988). Reilly antedated Firestone,but applied the arbitrary and capricious standard
to plan language that conferred discretion on Blue Cross. See id. at 419.
122 See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).

123 See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
124 See Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1990).
125 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1210112213 (Pamphlet 1992)).
126 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9), (10).
127 See id. § 12112(b)(2).
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state law. 128 Employers may also establish benefit plans that are
not regulated by state law-that is, self-insured plans regulated under
ERISA-so long as they are bona fide. 129 As litigation under the
ADA develops, it remains to be seen how much leeway employers
will be given to curtail potentially expensive coverage. Preexisting
condition exclusions, exclusions of certain types of coverage such as
mental health benefits, and high copayments structured to share
costs, all seem to be strategies that are likely to meet the standards
of the ADA, so long as they apply to all employees within a group,
despite their differential impact on employees with expensive health
needs.
An additional federal protection for employees discharged as a
result of health needs is the limited right to continue participation
in the employer's group health plan. Under the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),13 0 employers may elect to continue their benefits at a level just above the
employer's group cost if they have been subject to a "qualifying
event"-most importantly, job loss for reasons other than gross
misconduct.13 1
But this COBRA protection is very limited.
Participation is at the employee's own expense,1 3 2 an expense that
may be difficult to meet for employees who have lost their jobs
because of health needs. COBRA rights extend for only eighteen
months for discharged employees, and for thirty-six months for
beneficiaries who qualify because of divorce or death.13 3 If the
employer modifies the plan it provides for continuing employees,
COBRA beneficiaries' benefits will be likewise modified. If the
employer ceases to provide health benefits at all, COBRA continuation rights also end.1 3 4 The idea of COBRA is to allow discharged
employees to receive insurance more cheaply, because they continue
to participate in the risk pool of their employer's group plan. The
employer can avoid the costs of risk pooling with a COBRA
beneficiary, however, by changing the plan to exclude the expensive
128 See id. § 12201(c)(1)-(2).
129 See id. § 12201(c)(3).
10 Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (relevant sections codified in scattered

sections of 29 U.S.C.).
131 See 29 U.S.C. § 1163 (1988).
132 See id. § 1164(1).
1' See id. § 1162(2)(A). For a more optimistic view of COBRA, see Thomas H.
Somers, COBRA: An IncrementalApproach to NationalHealth Insurance, 5J. CONTEMP.

HEALTH L. & POL'Y 141, 152-54 (1989).
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1162(1), (2)(B) (1988).
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kind of coverage, so long as the employer is willing to impose the
same exclusion on all employees until the COBRA continuation
rights expire.

135

C. Loss of Group Insurance
Employer-provided benefits are the principal source of health
insurance for working Americans, but they are by no means the only
source. Individually purchased insurance, more affordable when
obtained through group plans, is an important source of insurance
for the self-employed or those who work for smaller employers.
New York is a leading example of how this kind of coverage is
presently in jeopardy. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield recently
dropped group coverage for members of professional and trade
associations in New York. 136 Empire claimed that it had been
caught in a vicious cycle: as costs-and rates-rose, the healthier
members of covered groups sought cheaper coverage elsewhere.1 -37 Empire was thus left providing group coverage for the
most expensive members of these groups. As an illustration, nearly
two thousand members of the New York State Bar had dropped the
Blue Cross plan as premiums rose.1 38 The decision by Empire to
drop group coverage affected 100,000 group members.13 9 Some
groups, such as the Bar, have replaced the Empire coverage, but
with policies that require health screening and thus do not help
140
members with already-apparent health care needs.
The most likely alternative for members of the dropped groups
is to buy individual coverage. By statute, Empire Blue Cross is
required to accept individual applicants; but it may impose far
higher rates and reduced coverage. 14 1 Some group members who
lost coverage estimate that their individual policies now cost over
$10,000 per year. 1 42 The withdrawn group coverage had been
offered on a periodic basis; group members did not have enforceable legal rights to its continuation. Nonetheless, as policies were
See id. (stating that only coverage identical to that of similarly situated
beneficiaries need be provided).
136 See Milt Freudenheim, Associations' CoverageCut by Blue Cross,N.Y. TIMESJune
13, 1991, at D1.
137 See id.
135

138 See id. at D8.
139 See id. at D1.

140 See id. at D8.
141 See id. at D1, D8.
142 See id. at Dl.

1992]

CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

1913

renewed year after year, policy holders may have come to count on
their availability. Job decisions-such as whether to remain in solo
practice-may have been importantly influenced by the presence of
the apparently reliable coverage. Now, for members of these groups
with apparent health needs, insurance coverage is unobtainable or
very expensive indeed.
CONCLUSION

Legal protection of expectations about the funding of health
care has thus tended towards a focus on written guarantees. Under
ERISA, retirees will not be protected against changes in their health
benefits if the employer has been careful to draft a termination
clause into the plan (and has not engaged in conduct sufficiently
encouraging to make it seem that the writing does not reflect the
actual deal). Decisions to deny benefits claimed under a health plan
will receive more deferential judicial scrutiny if the plan has been
drafted to confer discretion on the plan administrator. Although
employees cannot be fired in retaliation for using their health
benefits, they can be dismissed for absenteeism due to illness
(unless reasonable accommodation is possible as required by the
ADA); COBRA then permits them to continue any group insurance
for eighteen months at their own expense, an allowance that may be
beyond their financial reach and in any event is quite limited.
Insurers remain free to pull out of entire markets which they find
uneconomical, although Blue Cross plans in some states continue
to be obligated to provide individuals with community-rated
coverage-quite likely a very expensive option. Thus, today's
employees, together with yesterday's retirees, are experiencing a
great deal of instability and finding limited legal protection for their
health benefits.
Now, what should we make of these changes from the point of
view of expectations? Do they disappoint expectations in ways that
raise moral concerns? Or, are legal developments roughly congruent with protection of those expectations that are the most
compelling morally--expectations that are reasonable, encouraged,
longstanding, integral to the lives of those who have them, and
consistent with background justice? Defenders of the current
tendency to focus on the nature of actual agreements might argue
that current law is actually sorting out fairly well those expectations
that should matter from those that should not.
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Take the retirees in the Sixth Circuit, for example. Their
expectations are likely to be longstanding and central to their lives.
But questions may surely be raised about whether they are consistent with background justice, reasonable, or encouraged. Whether
they are consistent with background justice will depend on the
extent to which they shift resources to those who do not need or
deserve them. Some plans may indeed extend remarkably generous
benefits to sectors of the population that are already relatively well
insured by Medicare; other plans, however, may extend far more
modest benefits to retirees before and after Medicare eligibility.
Some employers may have made retirees quite well aware of the
likelihood that benefits would be changed, in which case expectations of continuation would not have been reasonable or encouraged. Other employers, however, may have made the stability of
benefits a real selling point to their employees, while carefully
retaining termination rights by drafting appropriate language into
the benefits contract.
Or consider decisions about whether particular kinds of therapy
are or are not covered under an employee benefit plan. Perhaps
employers are right to insist that decisions to deny benefits should
be given highly deferential review when they have drafted the plan
to reserve discretion to the plan administrator. It is not reasonable
orjust, employers might argue, for employees to expect health plans
to cover all claims, regardless of the expense or the unproved
efficacy of the therapy. Nor are employees encouraged to believe
that they will receive coverage for any therapy recommended by
their physicians, if they are clearly told that coverage denials are
within the discretion of their insurers. An example might be
employees offered a clear choice between insurance plans that allow
them to select physicians but reserve the right to deny claims at the
insurer's discretion, and plans that limit the choice of providers but
guarantee the payment of claims. 143 On the other hand, many
An example of such a choice was apparently present in the case of Sarchett v.
Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987):
Plaintiff argues, however, even if the policy is not ambiguous upon
close reading, it should still be construed in light of the "reasonable
expectation of the insured." The subscriber under a Blue Shield policy, he
contends, would reasonably expect to be covered for hospitalization
recommended by the treating physician. We do not question this description of the subscriber's expectations, but we doubt that it arises from any
belief that Blue Shield will cover all treatment recommended by a physician,
however unreasonable the recommendation. Instead, the subscriber expects
143
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employees may not have been told, or do not understand, the
import of plan language that reserves discretion to the plan
administrator.
Finally, perhaps it is not reasonable for employees to think that
their health needs will not affect their jobs, or, that the market
where they purchase health insurance will remain stable. Perhaps
they should be realistic and recognize that their employer has the
right to discharge them unless they have bargained otherwise, at
least within the limits set by the ADA. There are certainly contexts
in which employees have not been encouraged to count on stable
jobs. Similarly, it might be argued, providers of group coverage
such as Blue Cross have made no promises about what kinds of
policies will remain economically viable; those who had counted on
continued coverage were unreasonably optimistic and certainly
unencouraged. Some Blue Cross plans are required to provide
community-rated coverage to individuals, and COBRA continuation
rights remain-exceptions, it might be argued, that prove the rule,
because they have resulted from public policy decisions to make
some coverage available at least to those who can afford it. In
short, it might be concluded, people simply must come to understand that in a market economy, change is highly likely; bargained
contracts are the mechanism that is available to ensure stability.
But these arguments miss many of the morally important
features of expectations about health care benefits. In the first
place, explicit contract language may not reflect the actual forms of
encouragement that have grown up over time. Some employees, to
be sure, will have understood quite clearly what benefits they could
count on, and what benefits they could not. But other employees,
as illustrated by many of the cases discussed above, have not been
told clearly what they have and what the law will protect. Employcoverage because he trusts that his physician has recommended a reasonable
treatment consistent with good medical practice. Consequently we believe
the subscriber's expectations can be best fulfilled not by giving his physician
an unreviewable power to determine coverage, but by construing the policy
language liberally, so that uncertainties about the reasonableness of
treatment will be resolved in favor of coverage.
... Sarchett had a choice between the Blue Shield plan, which offered
him unlimited selection ofphysicians but provided for retrospective review,
and alternative plans which would require him to choose from among a
limited list of physicians but guaranteed payment.
Id. at 273-74 (citations omitted).
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ees are caught in a halfway world, in which historically shaped
expectations conflict with present reality.
Of course, over time the significance of contract language could
become quite well understood. New histories could be created,
histories in which employees expect little if any continuation of
their health benefits, except what is congruent with contractual
language or required by statute. Now, suppose people did come to
understand the limits of their benefits contracts and the nature of
the legal world in which these contracts are litigated. The expectations which they had been encouraged to have would then be
congruent with what would be protected legally.
But these
expectations might also be very limited; depending on how contracts
are drafted, people might have no expectations of stability at all.
Then the moral question to ask is whether it would be desirable to
create a world of such uncertainty. Would a world in which no one
had legitimate expectations to health insurance because they had
been carefully informed about reserved termination rights in their
benefits contracts be a morally diminished world? It would be a
world of realism, but it would also be a world of great fear about
the economic consequences of illness.
Moreover, explicit encouragement is only one morally relevant
feature of expectations. The current legal focus on the written
language of benefits contracts deflects us from other morally
relevant features of expectations. For example, consider the
funding of new therapeutic modalities.
As described above,
plaintiffs' success in challenging claims denials has turned on
whether there is language in the benefits contract that supports
limited or more extensive judicial review. But it is surely also
important to ask whether it is reasonable for the plaintiffs' to expect
to receive the therapy in light of current medical knowledge about
its efficacy. It may also be important to ask whether the care is
integral to the patients' lives; the Maryland breast cancer patients
seeking funding for bone marrow transplantation, for example, were
women in their thirties, with young children, who could not have
been said to have lived out the course of their lives. There are also
major issues of background justice about the funding of experimental care; the oncology community, for example, is now deeply
concerned that if insurers deny claims for clinical trials or new
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therapeutic modalities, progress in treating cancer will slow down
significantly. 144

This is not to say that these other features of expectations make
them all morally compelling. But it is to say that there are important moral issues raised by expectations which go beyond whether
they are provided for by current contractual language. These issues
are not being attended to by law or by public discussion. Public
discussion of which expectations matter, and of how the costs of
fulfilling them might be shared, would expand the moral debate. It
might also have the consequence of fostering expectations that both
are more reasonable and are more legitimate on other moral
grounds. Accountability for expectations is thus another important
piece of the argument for public responsibility for health policy in
the United States in the 1990s.

144 See William B. Farrar, Clinical TDials: Access and Reimbursement, 67 CANcER
1779,1782 (1991).

